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INTRODUCTION

"I now pronounce you husband and wife" is an iconic phrase
declared on what many men and women across the globe consider to be
the "happiest day" of their lives . . . their wedding day. As many

popular American stereotypes describe, a wedding is a time that most
* J.D., May 2011, University of Florida Fredric G. Levin College of Law. This Note
won the Barbara W. Makar Award. I would like to thank Professor Sharon Rush for her gracious
assistance in the development of this Note. In addition, many thanks to Professor Lynn Wardle
for his encouragement and support. Finally, I thank and dedicate this Note to my wife, daughter,
and family whose inspiration and reassurance have been a boon to me every step of the way.
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people anxiously anticipate, plan for, and even "dream" about since
childhood. It is the day that seemingly serves as the culmination of
every sentimental love story or fanciful fairy tale. In short, a wedding is
arguably the pinnacle symbol of love and devotion in today's culture.
However, regardless of all the "magic" that surrounds the
conventional wedding, the day is far more significant than heartfelt
vows, splendid gowns, or exquisite parties. In actuality, the wedding
marks a couple's entrance into what is the oldest and most important
social institution in the world.' Although the profound importance of
this notion often recedes into the background of these monumental
celebrations, indeed marriage, despite some portrayals from popular
entertainment culture, is much more than a "word," a "title," a
"certificate," or a "piece of paper." 2
For centuries, marriage has been recognized as not only the
foundational unit of society,3 but also as an institution that is absolutely
essential to individual progress, cultural advancement, and collective
prosperity.4 Because it has played such a vital role in society's
development, lawmakers, across cultures and for hundreds of ears,
have conferred upon this relationship a special, "highly preferred" legal
status.6 Consequently, humanity's historical regard for the marriage
relationship has had a transcendent effect across many areas of law.
For example, the preferential status of marriage currently impacts the
laws of adoption, education, property ownership, employee benefits,
employment discrimination, government subsidies, taxation, tort, and
intestacy.8
In recent years, however, the "highly preferred" status afforded to
the marriage relationship has come "under attack on several fronts."9
1. See Katherine Shaw Spaht, Covenant Marriage Seven Years Later: Its As Yet
Unfulfilled Promise, 65 LA. L. REV. 605, 612 (2005) (describing marriage as the oldest social
institution); see also Baker v. Baker, 13 Cal. 87, 94 (1859) (explaining that marriage is the
foundation of the social system).
2. Lynn D. Wardle, The Attack on Marriageas the Union of a Man and a Woman, 83
N.D. L. REv. 1365, 1370 (2007).
3. See Lynn D. Wardle, Legal Claims for Same-sex Marriage: Efforts to Legitimate a
Retreatfrom Marriageby Redefining Marriage,39 S. TEX. L. REv. 735, 754 (1998).
4. See, e.g., Brigitte Berger, The Social Roots of Prosperity and Liberty, 35 Soc'Y 44
(1998).
5. Lynn D. Wardle, A Critical Analysis of Constitutional Claims for Same-sex
Marriage,1996 BYU L. REv. 1, 29 (1996).
6. Wardle, supra note 2, at 1371-72.
7. Roger Severino, Or for Poorer? How Same-sex Marriage Threatens Religious
Liberty, 30 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 939, 942 (2007).
8. Id.
9. Richard G. Wilkins, The Constitutionality of Legal Preferences for Heterosexual
Marriage, 16 REGENT U. L. REV. 121, 122 (2004). It could also be argued that traditional
marriage is being attacked by ever-increasing rates of divorce, family abuse, and children born
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One such assault comes from skeptics who assert that the historic legal
benefits granted to husbands and wives should also be conferred upon
same-sex couples "who wish to enjoy the benefits of a marital
relationship."' To substantiate their claims, these advocates contend
that federal and state constitutions mandate the conferral of marital
benefits upon same-sex partnerships."
These contentions concerning the legal definition of marriage have
spawned fierce debate,12 which currently pervades the nation's political
landscape and permeates through much of society.13 Should the legal
definition of marriage include same-sex unions? Society's
overwhelming response to this controversial inquiry has been a
resounding no. In fact, a staggering majority of states-44 in all-have
raised their voice, either by citizen referendum or legislative
enactment,14 in favor of preserving the historical definition of marriage
out of wedlock. In addition, one could also argue that the institution of marriage is currently
under attack from increasing numbers of individuals who choose cohabitation in lieu of
marriage. These factors may cause some to question whether marriage has any continuing social
value at all. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. See, e.g., CNN.com, Gay MarriageSupporters Take to California Streets (Nov. 8,
http://articles.cnn.com/2008-11-08/us/same.sex.protests-l -rotest-route-peaceful2008),
protest-demonstrators?_s=PM:US.
13. See, e.g., CNN.com, Same-sex Marriage Rallies Stretch Across the Nation (Nov. 5,
2008), http://articles.cnn.con2008-11-15/us/same.sex.marriage_1 ballot-initiatives-protestersrallies? s=PM:US.
14. Twenty-nine states have raised their voice by constitutional amendment: Alabama
(ALA. CONST. art. I, § 36.03); Alaska (ALASKA CONST. art. 1, § 25); Arizona (ARIZ. CONST. art.
30, § 1); Arkansas (ARK. CONST. amend. 83, § 1); California (CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5);
Colorado (CoLo. CONST. art. 2, § 31); Florida (FLA. CONST. art. 1, § 27); Georgia (GA. CONST.
art. 1, § 4, I); Idaho (IDAHO CONST. art. III, § 28); Kansas (KAN. CONST. art. 15, § 16);
Kentucky (KY. CONST. § 233A); Louisiana (LA. CONST. art. XII, § 15); Michigan (MICH. CONST.
art. I, § 25); Mississippi (MIss. CONsT. art. 14, § 263A); Missouri (Mo. CONST. art. I, § 33);
Montana (MONT. CONST. art. XIII, § 7); Nebraska (NEB. CONST. art. I, § 29); Nevada (NEV.
CONST. art. I, § 21); North Dakota (N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 28); Ohio (OHIO CONST. art. XV, §
11); Oklahoma (OKLA. CONST. art. 2, § 35); Oregon (OR. CONST. art. XV, § 5a); South Carolina
(S.C. CONsT. art. XVII, § 15); South Dakota (S.D. CONST. art. XXI, § 9); Tennessee (TENN.
CONST. art. XI, § 18); Texas (TEX. CONST. art. 1, § 32); Utah (UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 29);
Virginia (VA. CONST. art. I, § 15-A); Wisconsin (WIsc. CONST. art. XIII, § 13). Another twelve
states restrict marriage to the union of a man and a woman by statute: Delaware (DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 13, § 101(a) & (d)); Hawaii (HAW. REV. STAT. § 572-1); Illinois (750 ILL. COMP.
STAT. 5/201, 212, 213.1); Indiana (IND. CODE § 31-11-1-1); Maine (ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19,
§§ 650, 701); Maryland (MD. CODE ANN. FAM. LAW § 2-201); Minnesota (MINN. STAT. §
517.03); North Carolina (N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 51-1, 51-1.2); Pennsylvania (23 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 1704); Washington (WASH. REV. CODE §§ 26.04.010, 26.04.020); West Virginia (W.
VA. CODE § 48-2-603); Wyoming (WYo. STAT. ANN. § 20-1-101). Four more states have
enacted marriage statutes that plainly assume the traditional opposite-sex definition of marriage.
See N.M. STAT. §§ 40-1-1 to 40-1-7; R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 15-1-1 to 15-1-5; Lewis v. Harris, 908
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as a union which exists exclusively between one man and one woman.15
However, despite this wave of legislative and moral support for
traditional marriage, the complexion of the legal definition of marriage
has taken an alarming twist as judicially active courts weigh in on the
issue. Such was the case in the recent decision of Perry v.
Schwarzenegger.16
In the Perry decision, a federal district court in California held that
the United States Constitution requires marriage to include same-sex
couples.' 7 While a handful of states have upheld a same-sex marriage
right under their respective state constitutions, the ruling in Perry,
upheld under the auspices of the Federal Constitution, marked a drastic
and unprecedented application of federal authority. Under the fagade of
judicial review, the federal court ventured beyond its authoritative
domain to fundamentally alter a sacred institution "deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition."' 8 Indeed, in fashioning an entirely new
constitutional right to same-sex marriage "out of whole cloth,"' 9 the
court spurned hundreds of years of social history and utterly betrayed
the three core principles of the U.S. Constitution-namely federalism,
democracy, and separation of powers.20 The court's mandate of samesex marriage unilaterally took the matter out of the normal
constitutional law-making processes and subverted American
democracy. In short, the extent to which the court exceeded its
constitutionally-permissible authority is extremely alarming.2 '
This Note will examine the recently decided case of Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, ultimately suggesting that this ruling is a marked
A.2d 196, 200 (N.J. 2006); Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 5-6 (N.Y. 2006).
15. "Until the end of the twentieth century, it could be accurately said that no nation in
the history of the world had ever legalized same-sex marriage." Lynn D. Wardle & Lincoln C.
Oliphant, In Praise ofLoving: Reflections on the "Loving Analogy "for Same-Sex Marriage,51
How. L.J. 117, 121 (2007). Advocates of same-sex marriage like to emphasize that some
societies accepted, approved, or even encouraged same-sex relations. See WILLIAM N.
ESKRIDGE, JR., THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 15-50 (1996). However, those homosexual

relationships were never deemed legal marriages nor given the same legal status as marriage.
Peter Lubin & Dwight Duncan, Follow the Footnote or the Advocate as Historianof Same-Sex
Marriage,47 CATH. U. L. REv. 1271, 1276 (1998).
16. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
17. Id. at 1003-04.
18. Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977).
19. Lynn D. Wardle, Restructuring Democracy or Lawlessness? Critical Reflections on
In Re Marriage Cases, 14 NEXUS 91, 93 (2009).
20. Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: OurPhilosopher-KingsAdopt Libertarianismas
our Official National Philosophyand Reject TraditionalMorality as a Basisfor Law, 65 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1139, 1140-41 (2004).
21. It could even be argued that Perry was a political show trial akin to the "Scopes
Monkey Trial." See Scope v. State, 289 S.W. 363 (1927); see also infra Part IV for a further
discussion on some of the fatal flaws of the Perry court that seemingly support this conclusion.
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example of judicial activism. Specifically, Part II will provide the
Note's context by briefly exploring the history of same-sex marriage
especially as it relates to California and the Perry decision itself. Next,
Part III will offer a brief discussion and analysis of judicial activism,
ultimately explaining what this concept is and more importantly, what it
is not. Part IV of this Note will examine a few specific ways that
seemingly indicate that Perry is indeed a judicially active decision.
Specifically, this Part will argue that Perry was judicial activism
because it violated the Constitution's three core principles and also
ignored binding precedent. Part V will discuss some of Perry's other
glaring flaws, which cast doubt on the integrity of the decision and
indicate that it ventured beyond the proper bounds of the judiciary.
Next, Part VI will analyze Perry's impact on marriage, family, and
society as a whole. Finally, this Note will conclude with some final
thoughts and impressions.
II. THE CONTEXT AND BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SAME-SEX
MARRIAGE DEBATE
22

Claims for the legalization of same-sex marriage are not novel. In
fact, although no nation in the history of the world ever legalized samesex marriage prior to the dawn of the twenty-first century, 23 history is
"sprinkled" with examples of individuals and groups who have sought
legitimization of homosexual relationships.
The first formal
legalization of same-sex marriage occurred in 2001.25 Since that time,
however, same-sex marriage has ridden "a wave of popularity among
some cultural elites in many Western societies. Given [this] trend, it is
not unlikely that at least a few more nations and perhaps even a couple
more American states may join the list of jurisdictions that [will]
legalize[] same-sex marriage...."26
At present, six U.S. States and the District of Columbia are the only
American jurisdictions that recognize same-sex unions. 27 In 2003,
22.
23.

Wardle, supra note 3, at 736-37.
See Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 121.

24.

See generallyESKRIDGE, supra note 15.

25. See Wardle, supra note 2, at 1367. In 1989, Denmark became the first jurisdiction to
afford same-sex partnerships the same legal rights as married couples. CBC News.com, Samesex Marriage Around the World, Aug. 4, 2010, http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/05/26/fsame-sex-timeline.html. However, in 2001, the Netherlands became the first country in the
world to officially legalize same-sex marriages. Id. The right was not officially recognized in
any U.S. jurisdiction until 2004 in Massachusetts. Id.
26. Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 123.
27. See supra note 14. Same-sex marriage is currently recognized in Connecticut, Iowa,
Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New York, Vermont, and Washington D.C. Id.
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Massachusetts became the first state to recognize a right to same-sex
marriage.28 The Massachusetts Supreme Court recognized the right
through a 4-3 plurality decision, which interpreted its state
constitution.29 In 2008, Connecticut followed Massachusetts's lead
when its state Supreme Court similarly held that the Connecticut
Constitution established a right to same-sex marriage.3 0 Then, in 2009,
the Iowa Supreme Court also recognized a same-sex marriage right
under its state constitution.31
In addition to these judicial enactments, four state legislatures have
authorized same-sex marriage by statute. The Maine legislature
authorized same-sex marriage-in 2009, and a year later, the Vermont
and New Hampshire legislatures likewise enacted statutes which
permitted the practice.3 2 Recently, New York also joined the ranks of
these aforementioned jurisdictions when its legislature similarly
authorized same-sex marriage by statute. However, not all of these
legislative enactments have remained in force. In fact, shortly after the
state legislature passed the statute in Maine, the citizens voted to repeal
it.3 3 Overall, while these jurisdictions recognize same-sex marriage,
proponents of gay rights continue to take an incremental, state-by-state
approach to enact same-sex marriage legislation in other jurisdictions. 34
One such jurisdiction that has been a battleground for same-sex
marriage legislation for many years is California. The debate in
California concerning same-sex marriage initially began in 1977 when
the state first banned the practice. 35 In that instance, California's
democratic legislature introduced an initiative defining marriage as
existing only between a man and a woman. 36 This initiative "breezed
through" the legislature and then-Governor Jerry Brown signed it into
28. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967-70 (Mass. 2003).
29. Id. at 969.
30. Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407,482 (Conn. 2008).
31. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 906 (Iowa 2009). See infra Part III.B.1 for further
discussion on the same-sex marriage situation in Iowa.
32.

N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.

§

457:46 (2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. xv,

§

8 (2010). The

District of Columbia also enacted a same-sex marriage ordinance in 2010 as well. D.C. CODE
46-401 (2009).
33.

§

See STATE OF MAINE, BUREAU OF CORPORATIONS, ELECTIONS AND COMMISSIONS,

"NOVEMBER 3,2009 GENERAL ELECTION TABULATIONS," available at http://www.maine.gov/sos/

cec/elec/2009/referendumbycounty.html.
34. See John M. Broder, Groups Debate Slower Strategy on Gay Rights, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 9, 2004, at Al, availableat http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/09/national/09gays.html; see
also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & NAN D. HUNTER, SEXUALITY, GENDER AND THE LAW 297 (2d

ed. 2004) (stating that "short-term modest advances followed by good or neutral consequences
for the community enable larger advances in the long term.").
35. SFGate.com, Same-sex Marriage, http://www.sfgate.com/same-sex-marriage/ (last
visited Nov. 4, 2010).
36.

CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 4100 (1977).
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law.3
Over twenty years later, California re-visited the issue in the
November 2000 election. This time, the initiative was Proposition 22,38
which amended the state's Family Code3 9 by declaring that "[o]nly
marriage between a man and a woman [would be] valid or recognized in
California."4 0 Although the California law adopted in 1977 already
"prohibit[ed] persons of the same sex from entering lawful marriage,'
Proposition 22 was a reaffirmation and further codification of the legal
definition of marriage "as a union between a man and a woman."4 2 The
initiative passed easily with 61% of the vote. 43
However, nearly nine years after Proposition 22's passing, the
California Su reme Court ruled that the initiative violated the state
Constitution.4 Consequently, all California counties were required to
issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples.4 5 While proponents of
same-sex marriage celebrated the ruling, supporters of traditional
marriage labored diligently to put the issue of marriage back into the
hands of voters. Their response was another marriage initiative:
Proposition 8.46
A. Proposition8
On November 4, 2008, over 13 million Californians converged on
voting booths across the state to weigh in one more time on the state's
legal definition of marriage.47 This time, the ballot measure was
Proposition 8.48 This initiative, entitled the "California Marriage
Protection Act," expressly amended the state Constitution to read that
"[o]nly marriage between a man and a woman [would be] valid or
37. Same-sex Marriage,supra note 35.
38. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 927-28 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
39. Id.
40. CAL. FAM. CODE § 308.5 (2001).
41. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 927.
42. Id. at 927-28 (quoting In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 794 (2008)).
43.

STATEMENT OF VOTE, NOVEMBER 2000, GENERAL ELECTION 155 (2000), available at

http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2000_primary/ measures.pdf (last visited Oct. 30, 2010).
44. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th at 857.
45. Id. From June 17, 2008 until the passing of Proposition 8 nearly 5 months later,
California counties issued approximately 18,000 marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Perry,
704 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
46.

CALIFORNIA

VOTER

REGISTRATION

GUIDE

127

(2008),

available

at

http://voterguide.sos.ca.gov/past/2008/general/text-proposed-laws/text-of-proposed-laws.pdf#
prop8; see also CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5.
47. STATEMENT OF VoTE, NOVEMBER 4, 2008, GENERAL ELECTION 7 (2008), available at
http://www.sos.ca.gov/elections/sov/2008 generall sovcomplete.pdf.
48.

§ 7.5.

CALIFORNIA VOTER REGISTRATION GUIDE, supra note 46; see also CAL. CONST. art. 1,
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recognized in California." 49 Ultimately, this measure propelled the
divisive issue of same-sex marriage back into the spotlight once again.50
After several months of heated campaigning 5 ' at a combined cost of
$83 million,52 the constitutional amendment passed, garnering 52.3% of
the vote. 53 For a second time, Californians had sided in favor of
traditional marriage. 54 However, they had also unwitting sparked
nationwide protests5 5 and widespread backlash in the process.
In the days, weeks, and months following the election, opponents of
Proposition 8 and gay rights activists displayed extraordinary animus,
violence, and hostility against the individuals and organizations that
supported the measure.5 7 For example, protesters shouted insults and
physically confronted people headed to worship;5 8 activists literally
invaded and took over church services;5 9 various properties were
vandalized and destroyed;60 Internet "blacklists" were circulated
singling out even small donors and their businesses for harassment and

49. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 7.5.
50. Same-sex marriage had already been held to be constitutional in other landmark
decisions. See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 967-70 (Mass. 2003).
51. MSNBC.com, More than $83 Million Spent on Prop 8, Feb. 2, 2009. Most polling
data showed that most people initially disagreed with Proposition 8. Id. However, by the end of
the campaign, the polling data showed a virtual dead heat. Id. One event that is believed to have
swayed voters to vote for Proposition 8 occurred when a first-grade class took a field trip to
watch their lesbian teacher get married at the courthouse. Jill Tucker, Class Surprises Lesbian
Teacher on Wedding Day, SFGATE.COM (Oct. 11, 2008), http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-1011/news/17134486_1field-trip-same-sex-marriage-public-school. The field trip took place just
a few weeks before the elections, and was not received well by many undecided voters. Id.
52. Id. Supporters of Proposition 8 raised $39.9 million while opponents of Proposition 8
raised $43.3 million. Id.
53.

STATEMENT OF VOTE, supra note 43, at 7. For comparison, during the 2010

presidential elections, Barack Obama received 52.9% of the popular vote nationally. See
RealClearPolitics.com, General Election: McCain vs. Obama, Final Results, http://www.real
(last
clearpolitics.com/epolls/2008/president/us/general-election-mccain-vs-obama-225.html
visited Oct. 30, 2010).
54.

STATEMENT OF VOTE, supra note 43, at 7.

55. CNN.com, supra note 13.
56. John Diaz, The Ugly Backlash Over Proposition 8, SFGATE.COM (Nov. 23, 2008),
http://articles.sfgate.com/2008-11-23/opinion/20871510_1_scott-eckem-free-speech-intimidati
on.
57. Id.
58. Wardle, supra note 19, at 99. For example, protestors prevented LDS members from
entering their Temple by such acts as throwing themselves onto cars entering the parking lot. Id.
59. Id. Activists in Michigan took over an Evangelical church service in Michigan by
yelling and throwing condoms. Id.
60. Id. For example, activists in Los Angeles used red paint to write hateful words on the
white pillars of the Los Angeles LDS Temple. Id. LDS churches and Jewish synagogues in
Nevada, Colorado, and Washington were likewise vandalized when activists spray-painted the
properties with hate speech and put glue in the door locks. Id
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boycott; 61 and death threats were made toward many individuals. 6 2 in
addition, several envelopes containing threatening "white powder" were
sent to various organizations who had lent support to the campaign. 63
While legal, non-violent expressions and demonstrations of
disappointment and anger are an important part of the democratic
dialogue,64 these well-documented and insidious acts of intimidation
went well beyond legal bounds.65
Not only did the passage of Proposition 8 set off a wave of reaction
across the country, but it also unleashed a litany of litigation which
challenged the proposition's constitutionality under the California
constitution.66 In the end, after two years of intense legal action, the
California Supreme Court ultimately upheld Proposition 8's
constitutionality.67 Shortly after this ruling, however, the Perry case
arose, and an entirely new federal constitutional challenge against
Proposition 8 commenced.
B. The Perry Decision
The Perry case began in May 2009 when two county clerks denied
61. Diaz, supra note 56. For example, a Palo Alto dentist lost two patients as a result of
donating $1,000 to the "Yes on 8" campaign. Id. In addition, the artistic director of the
California Musical Theater was forced to resign to spare his organization from an ensuing
boycott because he had given $1,000 dollars in support of Proposition 8. Id. Without a doubt,
personal donations in support of an initiative are a legal and constitutionally protected form of
political expression. Id.
62. Wardle, supranote 19, at 99. A simple Internet search on December 1, 2010 focusing
on Proposition 8 yielded shocking results concerning the violence and hostility that the election
created. See http://www.google.com/search?hl=en&biw- 1345&bih=517&q=Proposition+8+%
26+violence&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gsfrfai= (last visited Dec. 13, 2010).
63. Wardle, supra note 19, at 99. Envelopes with white powder were sent to the Los
Angeles and Salt Lake City Temples of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints as well
as the Ohio Knights of Columbus printing plant. Id.
64. While proponents of traditional marriage were definitely not innocent in their postelection tactics, the overwhelming weight of the evidence seems to indicate that same-sex
marriage supporters were the predominant instigators of this violent behavior. Diaz, supra note
56.
65. Such acts are also "dangerous to democracy and to the rule of law." Wardle, supra
note 19, at 99. For a discussion on how this type of targeted violence affects our democracy and
legal system, see Dahlia Lithwick, The Fear Factor: What Happens to Democracy When
Everyone's Too Scared to Show Up?, SLATE (June 19, 2010), http://www.slate.com/id/
2257500/.
66. See Strauss v. Horton, 46 Cal. 4th 364, 440 (2009) (overruling In re Marriage Cases,
43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008)).
67. See id. at 474-75. The California Supreme Court left intact the 18,000 same-sex
unions that were performed during the four and a half month period of time between the In re
Marriage Cases decision and the passage of Proposition 8. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d 921, 928 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
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marriage licenses to one lesbian couple, Kristin Perry and Sandra Steir
and one gay couple, Paul Katami and Jeffrey Zarrillo, respectively. 6
The sole basis for the clerks' denial was Proposition 8.69 Consequently,
the two couples70 filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California to challenge the validity of Proposition 8
under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal Protection
clauses.7 ' In the complaint, the plaintiffs named the two county clerks as
well as California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, California
Attorney General Jerry Brown, and two officials from the Department
72
Jerry Brown subsequently conceded Proposition 8's
of Health.
unconstitutionality at the outset of the litigation, and the other
government defendants declined to defend the merits.7 3 Hence, in July
2009, the official proponents of Proposition 8 under California's
election law were granted leave to intervene. 74
Perry's pretrial proceedings were filled with a variety of interesting
twists and turns. First, the plaintiffs filed a motion for preliminary
injunction, which would have restored same-sex marriage rights in
California until the lawsuit was decided. The court, however, denied
the plaintiffs' motion, instead preferring to proceed expeditiously to the
merits.76 Then, shortly after the court's denial, the plaintiffs requested
discovery of many of the "Yes on 8" campaign's internal documents,
which related to the underpinnings, purpose, and intent of the
amendment.7 7 Fearing that such discovery would harm political
speech, the defendants objected, arguing, that the First Amendment
protected such campaign communications. 9 The trial court, however,
disagreed and ordered the defendants to produce the materials.o The
68.

Complaint at 8, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No.

C 09-2292 VRW).
69. Id.
70. The City and County of San Francisco were later granted leave to intervene as a
plaintiff in August 2009. Perry,704 F. Supp. 2d at 928-29.
71. Id.
72. Complaint at 8, supra note 68, at 921.
73. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 928.
74. Id.
75. Plaintiffs' Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 20, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F.
Supp. 2d (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW).
76. Id.
77. Defendant-Intervenors' Objections to Discovery Orders of Magistrate Judge Spero at
9, 11, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW).
78. Id.
79. Id.; see also Dan Levine, Discovery Fight in Suit Challenging Caif Ban on Gay
Marriages, LAW.COM (Sept. 28, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=120243411
2536&Discovery Fight in Suit ChallengingCalif BanonGayMarriages&hbxlogin=1.
80. Lisa Leff, Judge: Prop 8 Campaign Must Release Campaign Data, SAN JOSE
MERCURY NEWS (Oct. 1, 2009), http://www.mercurynews.com/california/ci_13465868.
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defendants subsequently appealed the issue to the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals." Accordingly, the appellate court overturned the trial court. In
doing so, the Ninth Circuit not only held that the campaign documents
were constitutionally protected communication, but also that such
discovery "would likely have a chilling effect on political association
and the formulation of political expression." 82
The next pretrial twist came in September 2009, when Proposition 8
proponents filed a motion for summary judgment.83 The motion asserted
that Proposition 8 was constitutional and that Baker v. Nelson84
foreclosed any further review by a federal court. Alternatively, the
motion also argued that the plaintiffs' claims failed as a matter of law.86
After a lengthy hearing, the court denied the motion, noting that
Supreme Court precedent concerning sexual orientation and gender
discrimination had evolved since Baker. Hence, the court determined
that resolving the amendment's validity would require further
testimony. For this reason, the matter was set for trial. 89
Shortly before trial commenced, the federal court decided to
publically broadcast the trial across the country and over the internet. 90
Although such a broadcast actually violated the local federal court rules,
the court proposed a rule change which would allow the transmission to
take place. 9' While the plaintiffs welcomed the publicity, the defendants
objected, fearing that a broadcast would jeopardize their fair trial right
and cause further intimidation, backlash, and threats against their expert
witnesses.92 The defendants, in an attempt to halt the transmission,
81. SFGate.com, Court Tosses Prop. 8 Ruling on Strategy Papers, Dec. 12, 2009,
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f /c/a/2009/12/1 I /BA3AIB34VC.DTL.
82. Id.
83. Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 6, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW).
84. Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), dismissedfor want of a substantial
federal question, 409 U.S. 810 (1972).
85. See infra Part Ill.C for further discussion of Baker.
86. See Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 83, at 6.
87. Transcript of Hearing on Summary Judgment, at 79, 81-84, Perry v. Schwarzenegger,
704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW); see infra Part III.C for further
discussion.
88. Transcript of Hearing on Summary Judgment, supra note 87, at 90.
89. Id. at 90-91.
90. John Schwartz, Rule Invites Cameras into FederalCivil Cases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18,
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/19/us/I9cameras.html?r- 1.
91.

Edward Whelan, Dear Chief Judge Walker, NAT'L REv. ONLINE, Jan. 4, 2010,

http://www.nationalreview.comfbench-memos/49397/dear-chief-judge-walker-hellip/ed-whelan.
92. Bob Egelko, Prop. 8 Trial Will Be Shown on Youtube, SFGATE.COM (Jan. 7, 2010),
See
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2010/01/06/BA121BEGI8.DTL&tsp=1.
supra Part L.A for a discussion on the public backlash against Proposition 8 supporters. For a
discussion on how targeted violence can influence and affect witnesses, see Lithwick, supra
note 65.
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sought a writ of mandamus from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, but
the court denied their petition. As a result, the defendants sought an
emergency stay from the U.S. Supreme Court two days before the trial
commenced. 94 In a last-minute decision, the Court ruled 8-1 to
temporarily stay live streaming, and after further deliberation, the Court
later ruled 5-495 to indefinitely block live streams.9 6 Thus, there was no

broadcast. 97
Finally, after several months of pretrial procedure the litigation got
underway. At trial, the plaintiffs called eight lay witnesses and nine
expert witnesses, thus establishing an extensive record. 98 The
defendants' expert witnesses, however, remained extremely concerned
about the effect that their testifying would have on their physical safety
even without a public broadcast 9 As a result, all but two of the
defendants' witnesses withdrew.'00 Consequently, the defendants' trial
record was quite limited in both depth and breadth.' 0 '
After listening to the testimony and examining the evidence, the
court ultimately ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.10 2 The court determined
that California failed "to advance any rational basis in singling out gay
men and lesbians for denial of a marriage license."' 03 Therefore, the
court held that Proposition 8 violated both the plaintiffs' due process
and equal protection rights and was therefore unconstitutional. 104
As expected, the court's controversial decision in Perry ignited

93. Application for Immediate Stay of the District Court's Order Permitting Public
Broadcast of Trial Proceedings at 1, Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2432 (2010).
94. Id.
95. The vote broke down on ideological lines. Interestingly, Justice Kennedy, the justice
who many look to if the same-sex marriage issue ever comes before the Supreme Court, voted
in favor of not broadcasting the proceedings.
96. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2432 (2010). The Court held that the lower federal
court had failed to follow proper legal procedure in ordering live video streams of the trial. Id.
97. Paul Elias & Mark Sherman, High Court: No Cameras at Gay Marriage Trial,
SEATTLE TIMES (Jan. 13, 2010), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2010785955_
apussupremecourtgaymarriagetrial.htmll.
98. Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 932 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
99. Id. at 944; see also supra Part I.A. Considering the widespread backlash that
proponents of Proposition 8 were continuing to experience at the time, these concerns seemed
well-justified. For a discussion on how targeted violence can influence and affect witnesses, see
Lithwick, supra note 65.
100. Perry,704 F. Supp. 2d at 944.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1003-04.
103. Id. at 1003. Although beyond the scope of this Note, the author disagrees with this
assertion that Proposition 8 fails rational basis scrutiny, especially in light of what has
traditionally passed this highly deferential standard of review in the past. See infra Part III.C for
a very brief discussion of this issue.
104. Perry, 704 F. Supp. 2d at 1004.
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public reaction that registered from one extreme to the other.10 While
many proponents of same-sex marriage praised the court's ruling as a
protection of equality, others branded the court's fashioning of a new
constitutional right to same-sex marriage as a marked example of
* _ 06
~
judicial* activism.
III. WHAT IS JUDICIAL

ACTIVISM

ANYWAY?

Although the definition is somewhat "slippery" 0 7 and ambiguous,' 0 8
judicial activism generally describes "[a] philosophy of judicial
decision-making whereby judges allow their personal views about
public policy, among other factors, to guide their decisions."' 09
Accordingly, judges who adhere to this philosophy "tend to find
constitutional violations" in arguably sound policies and "are willing to
ignore precedent.""i 0 Of course, judicial activism is not "synonymous
with merely exercising judicial review,"' -the practical power of
courts to disallow policy choices made by other government officials on
the grounds that they violate the Constitution.' Without question, the
courts are permitted, and even designed, to strike down unconstitutional
laws, but judicial activism occurs when jurists go beyond to overturn
constitutional policies.
The notion of judicial activism traces its roots back to the inherently
human nature of jurists. Despite popular perception at times, judges are
subject to the same frailties, temptations, and biases that plague all mere
mortals. Just like a person who consciously disobeys a law which he or
she personally perceives as unjust or offensive, "judges sometimes
refuse to enforce laws that offend their [personal or] moral beliefs."ll 3
Although such judicial disobedience is classical judicial activism, it can
also take on a variety of other forms.11 4 These forms include such
actions as striking down arguably constitutional measures of other
105. USAToday.com, Prop 8 Ruling Drives Strong Religious Reactions: Outrage to Joy,
Aug. 4, 2010, http://content.usatoday.com/communities/Religion/post/2010/08/prop-8-proposit
ion-8-califomia-gay-marriage-vaugh-walker/1?csp=34.
106. Id.
107. Frank H. Easterbrook, Do Liberals and Conservatives Difer in JudicialActivism?, 73
U. COLO.L. REv. 1401, 1401 (2002).
10 8. Id.
109. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 391 (9th ed. 1999).

110. Id.
Il1. Keenan D. Kmiec, Comment, The Origin and Current Meanings of "Judicial
Activism, " 92 CAL. L. REv. 1441, 1464 (2004).
112. Graglia, supra note 20, at 1142.
113. Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102
MICH. L. REv. 1555, 1556 (2004).
114. Kmiec, supra note 1ll, at 1471.
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branches, infringing upon other governmental powers, ignoring
precedent, legislating from the bench, departing from accepted
interpretive methodologies, and judging with a results-oriented

approach. 115
These quintessential examples of judicial improvisation often occur
covertly, but in some instances can be fairly open.1 6 At any rate,
judicial activism is a judicial overstep of constitutional authority and an
infringement upon many age-old democratic ideals." 7
IV. PERRY IS AN EXAMPLE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM

While any number of arguments could be made concerning the ways
in which Perry exceeded the proper bounds of the judiciary, 1 Part III
will focus on three specific points that support the theory that Perry is
indeed a form of judicial activism. Specifically, the federal court in
Perry infringed upon a state's power to define marriage; violated the
principles of democracy and separation of powers by legislating from
the bench; and ignored binding precedent.
A. Perry Imposes on the PrincipleofFederalism
Federalism is one of the hallmarks of American democracy, which
activist federal jurists can significantly affect. Indeed, the delicate
interplay between state and federal government power demonstrates a
persistent tug-of-war that has seemingly existed since the founding of
the American republic.1 9 In the end, regardless of how the Supreme
Court has articulated the ever-changing balance of power throughout the
course of history, it is undeniable that without this core doctrine, the
government would cease to operate "of the people, by the people, and
for the people." 20
The federalist structure is predominantly implied through the Tenth
Amendment, which states that "[t]he powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
115. Id.
116. Lund & McGinnis, supranote 113, at 1557.
117. Kmiec, supra note 111, at 1464-66.
118. See supra note 21 and accompanying text for some of these arguments.
119. "A basic principle of American government is that Congress may act only if there is
express or implied authority to act in the Constitution; states, however, may act unless the
Constitution prohibits the action... . [a] key difference between federal and state governments
is that only the latter possess the police power. The police power allows state and local
governments to adopt any law that is not prohibited by the Constitution." ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 234 (3d ed. 2006).
120. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863).
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reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." 2 1 Accordingly,
this Amendment protects sovereign states from federal intrusion.122 The
rationale for this design is threefold:' 2 3 first, to protect the states from
federal tyranny by distributing power; second, to provide a state
government that is closer and more responsive to the people; and
finally, to allow individual states to experiment with novel social or
economic arrangements, without the attendant disruption of forcing the
entire nation to do so.12 4 Therefore, under this approach, courts should
declare as unconstitutional any federal laws which intrude into the
"zone of activity" that is exclusively reserved to the states.1 25
Because the federal government, by design, possesses only limited
powers, the states are left with most of the responsibility for setting
social policy.126 One such social policy that has always been "entrusted
to the people acting through state governments" is the fundamental legal
definition of marriage. 1 In fact, the Supreme Court has long
recognized that the authority to regulate marriage belongs with the

121. U.S. CONST. amend. X. This Note does not explore the effect that the U.S.
Constitution's Full Faith and Credit Clause or Privileges and Immunities Clause has on
Proposition 8 and the issue of same-sex marriage. See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1-2. The Full Faith
and Credit Clause addresses the duties that states have to respect the "public acts, records, and
judicial proceedings" of other states. Id. § 1. Therefore, marriage licenses and certificates would
fall under this provision. In addition, the Privileges and Immunities Clause provision states:
"The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the
several States." Id. § 2. The Supreme Court has largely interpreted this clause as a limit on the
state's ability to "[discriminate] against citizens of other States in favor of its own" with regard
to fundamental rights and important economic interests. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 119, at 446
(quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 511 (1939)). Therefore, most
challenges that come under the Privileges and Immunities Clause involve state and local laws
that discriminate against out-of-staters. Id. In fact, discrimination against out-of-staters is a
prerequisite for application of this provision. See generally id.; see also Zobel v. Williams, 457
U.S. 55, 59 n.5 (1982). In the end, the effect of the full faith and credit clause or the privileges
and immunities clause on Proposition 8 is beyond the scope of this Note. However, the author
acknowledges that there has been much speculation on the possible application of these clauses
to same-sex marriage. Although not addressed here, whether these clauses of the Constitution
require states to legally recognize same-sex unions performed in other jurisdictions is an
interesting and on-going debate.
122. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 119, at 313.
123. Id. at 313-15.
124. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
125. CHEMERNSKY, Supra note 119, at 313.
126. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 113, at 1599.
127. Brief for States of Indiana et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at 2, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 09-CV-2292 VRW) [hereinafter
Amicus Brief]. In addition, the States, not the federal government, have the power to issue
marriage licenses and grant divorces. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703
(1992).
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states128 and has reinforced this notion through precedent.129 In fact,
cases interpreting the Tenth Amendment have often singled out
marriage as a primary example "of the type of regulation which is
reserved to the states and beyond the regulatory authority of the national
government." 30 Undoubtedly, this fundamental principle of federalism
still rings true today.13 1
Certainly, allowing the states to regulate marriage reinforces all three
of the underlying rationales of federalism. First, it distributes power and
prevents the federal government from tyrannically intervening and
imposing a single marriage law on all Americans. Second, since citizens
are best positioned to weigh the myriad social, economic, cultural, and
moral consequences of altering the legal definition of marriage, the
federalist structure provides more responsive elected state and local
128. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
129. See, e.g., Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975) ('"The State ... has absolute right
to prescribe the conditions upon which the marriage relation between its own citizens shall be
created . . . .') (quoting Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 734-35 (1877)). The state's primary
authority over family law is confirmed by the definite limitations placed upon federal powers.
Amicus Brief, supra note 127, at 3. For example, even the broadest conceptions of
congressional power under the commerce clause forbid any possibility that Congress could
regulate marriage. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 624 (1995) (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(stating, as does the majority, that the commerce power cannot extend to "regulate marriage,
divorce, and child custody") (quotations omitted). In addition, the federal judiciary likewise
lacks the power to interfere with the state's primacy over family law and marriage. For instance,
the Supreme Court identified the maxim of state sovereignty long ago when it stated that "[t]he
whole subject of domestic relations of husband and wife, parent and child, belongs to the laws
of the states, and not the laws of the United States." Ex parte Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94
(1890) (finding a lack of federal habeas jurisdiction to resolve a custody dispute). Based upon
this exact principle, the Court has likewise recognized that "the domestic relations exception ...
divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child custody decrees."
Ankenbrandt, 504 U.S. at 703. Federal restraint in state matters is also required "when a case
presents 'difficult questions of state law bearing on policy problems of substantial public import
.... ' Id. at 705-06 (quoting Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800, 814 (1976)). This is especially true where federal judicial power threatens to undermine
areas at the "core" of state sovereignty, such as marital status or parental status. See id. at 706;
id. at 716 (Blackmun, J., concurring). See generally Amicus Brief, supra note 127, at 2-3.
130. Lynn D. Wardle, Tyranny, Federalism, and the Federal Marriage Amendment, 17
YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 221, 241 (2005). Besides protecting against congressional overreaching,
"the Tenth Amendment preserves a structural reservation of the authority to regulate domestic
relations to the states, and that structural barrier sometimes has been cited by the Court in
upholding state family laws and policies." Id. See, e.g., Sosna, 419 U.S. at 404 (upholding state
residency requirement to obtain a divorce).
131. Amicus Brief, supra note 127, at 3. In addition, as President Barack Obama has said:
"I agree with most Americans, with Democrats and Republicans . . . with over 2,000 religious
leaders of all different beliefs, that decisions about marriages, as they always have, should be
left to the States." See Tara Wall, Commentary: Obama and Bush Are Not So Far Apart,
CNN.coM (Oct. 13, 2008), http://edition.cnn.com/2008/POLITICS/10/13/wall.bush-obama/in
dex.html.
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government representatives through which citizens can act. Finally,
allowing states to regulate marriage permits states to be zones of
experimentation without affecting the entire nation. This is precisely
what has taken place as same-sex marriage has been legalized in some
states. 32
However, despite the states' "virtually exclusive province" over
marriage and domestic relations law, the power of the state to regulate
marriage is not without limit.133 For example, states "may not employ
the legal parameters of marriage to discriminate against either spouse or
to perpetuate the badges of slavery."' 34 One infamous case involving
35
in which a unanimous
such discrimination was Loving v. Virginia,1
U.S. Supreme Court declared the state of Virginia's anti-miscegenation
statute unconstitutional.13 6 In its decision, the Loving Court held that
Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws were "incident to slavery" and
"measures designed to maintain White Supremacy."' 3 ' The Court
further observed that, over the years, it had "consistently repudiated
'[d]istinctions between citizens solely because of their ancestry' as
being 'odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the
doctrine of equality."" No doubt, in situations where such prejudice
takes place, federal intervention is not only justified, but also warranted,
to defend the basic assurances guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment.'
However, equating the brilliant and necessary federal intervention in
Loving to the federal intrusion in Perry is like comparing apples and
oranges.140 To be sure, laws based upon race and ethnicity are the most
highly suspect classifications in the American legal system and thus are
subject to the most exacting level of scrutiny. Without question, laws
based upon race have no rational relationship to marriage. They simply
perpetuate a type of discrimination that torments this nation's history.
Sexual orientation, on the other hand, is much different. It is not a
132. See supratext accompanying note 27.
133. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 398 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring) (quoting
Sosna, 419 U.S. at 404); see also Loving, 388 U.S. at 7 (stating that the "state court is no doubt
correct in asserting that marriage is a social relation subject to the State's police power," but that
the State's powers to regulate marriage are not unlimited "notwithstanding the commands of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
134. Amicus Brief, supra note 127, at 4. See, e.g., Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 278-79
(1979); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7, 14-15 (1975); Loving, 388 U.S. at 7-12.
135. Loving, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
136. Id. at 12.
137. Id. at 6, 11.
138. Id (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943)).
139. See, e.g., id. at 6 (describing Virginia's anti-miscegenation laws as "incident to
slavery").
140. Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 144.
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protected class under the Constitution, and thus subject to a lesser,
highly differential tier of judicial scrutiny.141 Additionally, unlike race
or ethnicity, "maleness and femaleness are thoroughly rational criteria
for marriage." 4 2 Indeed, as an intermediate court in New Jersey
summarized, "Anti-miscegenation laws simply may not be equated with
laws reserving marriage to opposite-sex couples. Marriage has an
inherent nature, and race is not intrinsic to that status. . . . In

contradistinction, a core feature of marriage is its binary, opposite-sex
nature." 43 Hence, the Loving analogy used in support of federal
intrusion into the state regulated institution of marriage unquestionably
fails.144
Applying these principles, the definition of marriage was clearly
within the California's regulation powers protected by the Tenth
Amendment. Marriage had always been regulated by the states, and
Californians democratically chose to reaffirm their state's definition of
marriage on two separate occasions as the exclusive union of one man
and one woman. Indeed, Proposition 8 simply reaffirmed the marriage
definition that is "objectively, 'deeply rooted in this Nation's history
and tradition."' 1 45 Overall, the court in Perry seemingly imposes its own
policy and morals concerning marriage upon California, thus effectively
intruding upon state sovereignty. For this reason, the decision was
unconstitutional and judicial activism in its truest sense.
B. Perry Violates Democracy and SeparationofPowers
Despite Perry's exceptional display of judicial improvisation into
states' rights, many people still do not see why a federal court's
redefinition of marriage is problematic. These individuals fail to realize
that besides the court being ill-suited for this type of analysis, the
court's decision in this case also subverts the democratic process and
violates separation of powers.
Democracy and separation of powers are two related doctrines that
serve as the bedrock of America's constitutional system of
141. Homosexuals have not technically been qualified as a suspect class and thus
classifications based on sexual orientation have been historically subject to rational basis
review. ESKRIDGE & HUNTER, supra note 34, at 242; see also Jeremy B. Smith, Note, The Flaws
of Rational Basis with Bite: Why the Supreme Court Should Acknowledge Its Application of
HeightenedScrutiny to ClassificationsBased on Sexual Orientation,73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2769,
2786 (2005).
142. Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 168.
143. Lewis v. Harris, 875 A.2d 259, 277 (N.J. 2005) (Parrillo, J., concurring).
144. For an interesting argument as to why Loving is an inappropriate analogy to use to
support same-sex marriage, see generally Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15.
145. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997) (quoting Moore v. City of
East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
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government.146
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Democracy asserts that the government derives its

powers from the "Consent of the Governed ..

"47

As a result, under

American democracy, citizens serve as sovereign-principals who
delegate powers, through their Constitution, to their agentgovernment.1 4 8
Separation of powers builds upon the democratic notion of
government by the people.149 Separation of powers affirms that the
people have granted specific and limited powers to each branch of
Thus, no single branch, including the judiciary, can
government.1
exceed its own powers or usurp the powers of the other branches.'5 In
this way, the people, through the Constitution, have delegated the lawmaking authority to the Legislature and the authority to interpret and
apply the law to the Judicial Branch. 152 Hence, "when judges move
beyond applying the law in particular cases to creating the law to be
applied to all people, these judges are acting more like legislators and
ought to be more accountable to the people."1 53 To be sure, courts do
not have authority to legally amend the Constitution or effectively do so
through creative "interpretation" that allows the imposition of personal
policy preferences upon citizens. 1 54 For this reason, the democratic
process, and not the judiciary, is the proper mechanism for enacting
same-sex marriage legislation.
Not only is the legislative process a constitutional mechanism for
enacting legal change, but it also has many advantages over the
judiciary in deciding sensitive issues like same-sex marriage. For
example, the flexibility of the electoral process permits more
incremental change to take place. Additionally, the political process
allows the citizenry to control the pace of this change.'s
Furthermore, social norms enacted by judicial decree as opposed to
the legislative process are often more costly to correct. 156 This is due in
part to the doctrine of stare decisis, which frequently protects prior

146.

JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70

(7th ed. 2004).
147.

THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).

148.

Wardle, supra note 19, at 96, 97.

149.

NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 146, at 70.

150.

Id.

151.

Id.

152. Id.
153. E-mail from Lynn D. Wardle, Bruce C. Hafen Professor of Law, J. Reuben Clark
Law School, Brigham Young University, to Chad Muir, Law Student, University of Florida
Levin College of Law (Oct. 26, 2010, 11:23:20 EST) (on file with author).
154. Id.
155. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 113, at 1602.
156. Id. at 1602, 1605.
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decisions from judicial overrule.' 5 7 Therefore, judicially enacted norms
that later prove to have "unforeseen drawbacks" can be difficult to
repeal.' 5 8 Conversely, the electoral process is more responsive to everchanging circumstances, new information, and evolving preferences.' 59
Moreover, while courts have a comparative advantage in performing
legal analysis, they have no advantage "in making policy udgments
about the proper line between liberty and license . . . .

Thus, in

politically-charged contexts like the same-sex marriage debate, judicial
action can become "indistinguishable from naked political judgments"
based upon what a jurist believes is just or society will tolerate.16 '
Moving this type of policy debate from the legislative process to a court
can taint the public's confidence in an independent and impartial
judiciary. This lack of confidence is often exacerbated by the fact that
federal jurists are immune from the traditional democratic mechanisms
of political accountability.
Despite these clear advantages, many still recognize a potential
problem inherent to the democratic process: the fact that leaving certain
issues to the electorate leaves politically powerless constituents without
a voice and vulnerable to the majority. In these circumstances, courts
serve as protectors of politically impotent minorities.163 Without
question, same-sex marriage activists endorse this argument, alleging
that the political powerlessness of the homosexual community at large
is extreme enough to warrant court protection and intervention.1 64 While
history will not disagree that the homosexual community has been' 65 the
target of senseless discrimination and was without political power or
protection at one time, this argument generally overstates the current
state of affairs.' 66 In fact, most recent evidence suggests that the
homosexual community has grown in political status and influence to
the point where they are actually extremely powerful, especially in

California.' 67
157. Id. at 1605.
158. Id. at 1602.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1603.
161. Id. at 1606.
162. See generally, e.g., C. Johnson, Prop 8 Trial Witness: Gays are PoliticallyPowerful,
ABCNEWS (Jan. 25, 2010), http://www.newsl0.net/news/story.aspx?storyid=73995&catid=339.
163. See, e.g., id.
164. Id. This is precisely the reason why many gay-rights activists would like to see the
courts use heightened scrutiny in cases concerning homosexuals.
165. There is little doubt that the homosexual community unfortunately continues to be the
recipient of some appalling treatment still today.
166. See Johnson,supra note 162.
167. See id. As Professor Lynn Wardle states:
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As evidence of this, one need only look to the Proposition 8
campaign itself. Without question, financing has a powerful influence
on electoral politics. 168 Accordingly, proponents of same-sex marriage
out-fundraised and outspent their traditional marriage counterparts
during the campaign.' 69 In addition, there was no shortage of influential
elective officials that supported California's push for same-sex
marriage.170 Indeed, both U.S. Senators from California, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Governor of California, several state
senators, the current mayors of California's largest cities, several state
and federal representatives, and the California Attorney General all
came out in support of same-sex marriage. 171 This list does not include
the many celebrities and Hollywood icons that also rallied in support of
same-sex unions.172 Finally, the nationwide protests before and after the
passage of Proposition 8 further illustrate the political power and
prowess of this constituency. 173 For these reasons, the homosexual
community, although politically weak at one time, is now a very
influential player in the democratic process.174
Given these facts, the political process, and not the courts, is not
only the more constitutionally acceptable method for creating new
marriage rights, but also the most appropriate. Hence, the Perry court's
disregard of this process is necessarily disturbing, especially in such a
highly visible case. Many fear that judicial activism in such a case as
Same-sex couples are not an impotent minority. Rather, they have proven
repeatedly that they have significant political influence, and they appear to
participate at no proportional disadvantage in the democratic political process.
Indeed, it appears that gays and lesbians have political clout in most western
countries that is, if anything, disproportionately greater than their numbers.
Wardle, supra note 3, at 756.
168. See, e.g., MSNBC.com, supra note 51; E-mail from Lynn D. Wardle, supranote 153.
169. See MSNBC.com, supra note 51. In fact, same-sex marriage proponents at least
matched or outspent their traditional marriage counterparts in both the Proposition 8 campaign
in California as well as the Proposition I campaign in Maine. E-mail from Lynn D. Wardle,
supra note 153.
170. See, e.g., Craig Howie, Social Media Wrap: Schwarzenegger,Newsom, Brown and
Others React to Prop. 8 Ruling Online, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2010), http://latimesblogs.latimes.
com/washington/2010/08/social-media-wrap-newsome-brown-villara igosa-and-others-react-toprop-8-ruling-online.html; see also Johnson, supra note 162.
171. See, e.g., Howie, supra note 170; see also Johnson,supra note 162.
172. See, e.g., Kara Warner, Prop 8 Ruling Celebratedby Ellen Degeneres,ParisHilton,
More: Ricky Martin, Kim Kardashian and Other Celebs Hit Twitter After California's Gaymarriage Ban is Overturned, MTV.coM (Aug. 4, 2010), http://www.mtv.cominews/articles/
1645107/20100804/degeneres ellen.jhtml.
173. CNN.com, supra note 13.
174. The political power of the homosexual community is further evidenced by the sheer
volume of legislation, which the gay community publically endorses, that is ultimately passed
into law. See supra text accompanying note 167.
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Perry "promises future adventurism unconstrained by anything but the
will of the [judiciary]."'" In short, the court's undisciplined judicial
legislation using "armchair analysis" effectively substituted the will of
7,001,084 Californians for that of a single judicial majority; a majority
that is immune from the popular electorate. 7 6 Without question, such a
decree truly tests the integrity of America's political democracy.
C. The Citizens Response to JudicialOverreachingin
Same-Sex Marriage
While federalism, separation of powers, and the political process do
not operate flawlessly or instantaneously, Americans still recognize that
these constitutional mechanisms for enacting legal change "have
numerous advantages over the impatient and self-satisfied imposition of
constitutionally unjustified judicial edicts." 77 In fact, recent
developments concerning a judicially enacted same-sex marriage law in
Iowa indicate that citizens prefer these three mechanisms over jurists
who leave the judicial arena to mandate same-sex marriage rights.
The issue of same-sex marriage in Iowa began in 2005 when six
same-sex couples filed suit against the Polk County Recorder for
denying the gay and lesbian couples' application for marriage.' At that
time, Iowa law only allowed marriage between a male and a female.' 79
The couples claimed that this statutory ban on same-sex marriage
violated "certain liberty and equality rights under the Iowa
constitution."] 8 0 In 2007, the Polk County District Court granted a
summary judgment motion for the plaintiffs, thus prompting the
county's appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court.' 8 ' On April 3, 2009, the
Iowa Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision, upheld the district
court's ruling, ultimately deciding that the statute, which limited
marriage to a man and a woman, violated same-sex couples' equal
protection rights.' 82
The Iowa Supreme Court's ruling shocked many Iowans,183 and the
citizens response to the ruling lends evidence to the fact that citizens do
not want "legislators in robes" creating and enacting a state's marriage
175. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 113, at 1557.
176. Id. at 1602.
177. Id. at 1557.
178. Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862, 873 (Iowa 2009).
179. See IOWA CODE § 595.2(1) (2009).
180. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 873.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Lawrence Jones, Iowans Rally Against Gay Marriage, CHRISTIAN POST (Apr. 14,
2009), http://www.christianpost.com/article/20090414/iowans-rally-against-gay-marriage/.
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law.184 To this end, on November 2, 2010, Iowans used the state's
retention election system to oust three of the seven Iowa Supreme Court
justices who had participated in the unanimous 2009 ruling. 85 Because
Iowa Supreme Court justices serve staggered eight year terms, the
remaining four justices were not up for election, but time will only tell
if the electorate will seek their removal as well. 86
This unprecedented incident marked the first time an Iowa Supreme
Court justice has not been retained since the merit retention system was
adopted. Moreover, all seventy-one lower court judges who were on
the ballot easily won re-election. 188 Thus, only those jurists who had
participated in redefining Iowa's marriage law were ousted. Clearly,
Iowans were not pleased with the state high court's activism and
decided to respond. Overall, this example supports the sentiment that
Americans greatly respect the constitutional principles of democracy
and separation of powers.
D. Perry Ignored Binding Precedent
While the Perry court's betrayal of federalism, democracy, and
separation of powers indicates a transgression of authority, another
paragon of judicial activism is the court's interpretation and subsequent
disregard of the precedent set forth in Baker v. Nelson.18 1 Ultimately,
the district court was bound by Baker and therefore should have granted
the defendants' motion for summary judgment, which raised the
issue. 190 In sum, there should have never been a trial.
In Baker v. Nelson, two adult men applied for a marriage license in
Minnesota's Hennepin County.191 The county clerk rejected their
application on the ground that the applicants were both male. 92
Consequently, the couple filed suit in state court seeking a writ of
184. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster oflowa Judges Sends Signal To Bench, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html.
185. Id.
186. Justices serve staggered, eight-year terms. Grant Schulte, Iowans Dismiss Three
Justices, DES MOINES REG. (Nov. 3, 2010), http://www.desmoinesregister.com/article/
20101103/NEWSO9/11030390/Iowans-dismiss-three-justices. Therefore, David Wiggins is up
for retention in 2012, while Mark Cady, Daryl Hecht, and Brent Appel are all up for retention in
2016. Id.
187. Id.
188. Sulzberger, supra note 184.
189. 191 N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971), dismissedfor want of a substantialfederal question,
409 U.S. 810 (1972) (No. 71-1027).
190. See Defendant-Intervenors' Motion for Summary Judgment, supra note 83, at 6.
191. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185. For an interesting discussion on how Loving v. Virginia
relates to Baker v. Nelson as well as how both of these cases generally relate to the issue of
same-sex marriage, see Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 137-43.
192. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 185.
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mandamus to compel the clerk to issue the marriage license.' 93 The trial
court quashed the writ, and the Minnesota Supreme Court explicitly
addressed the issues of "whether a marriage of two persons of the same
sex is authorized by state statutes and, if not, whether state authorization
is constitutionally compelled." 194
After rejecting the appellant's claim that the Minnesota marriage
statute authorized same-sex marriage, 19 5 the court unanimously rejected
the claim that the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses required the state to allow same-sex couples to
marry.196 In addition, because it found no support in any U.S. Supreme
Court opinion, the Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the appellants'
assertion "that the right to marry without regard to the sex of the parties
is a fundamental right" and that limiting marriage to opposite sex
couples was "irrational and invidiously discriminatory."' 9 7
While making these findings, the court acknowledged that the
uniquely conjugal nature of marriage was deeply rooted in both society
One such precedent that the
and Supreme Court precedents.
Minnesota Supreme Court addressed was Griswold v. Connecticut.199
The Minnesota Supreme Court ultimately refuted the appellants'
reliance on the Griswold decision because in Griswold, the U.S.
Supreme Court protected the sacred nature of the marital relationship as
"an intimate relation of husband and wife."2 oo Supporting the Minnesota
Supreme Court's decision to reject the appellants' Griswold argument
was the fact that the purpose of Griswold was to allow married couples
access to contraceptives-devices designed to allow male-female sexual
relations without procreation.201
Furthermore, the Minnesota Supreme Court also squarely considered
and rejected the appellants' Loving v. Virginia202 analogy because there
was a clear distinction, both "in common sense and in a constitutional
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 185-86. The court rejected the argument that "the absence of an express
statutory prohibition against same-sex marriage evinces a legislative intent to authorize such
marriages" because the "common usage" of "marriage" in the statutes meant "the state of union
between persons of the opposite sex." Id. The term, according to the court, had that meaning at
the time the marriage laws were adopted and continued to have that meaning. Id. Indeed, the
court noted that "the present statute is replete with words of heterosexual import such as
'husband and wife' and 'bride and groom."' Id. See also Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at
138 n.82.
196. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186-87.
197. Id. at 186.
198. Id. at 186-87.
199. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
200. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 186 (citing Griswold,381 U.S. at 482).
201. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480, 485-86.
202. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
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sense," 203 between a marital restriction based upon race and one based
upon the fundamental difference in sex.204 For these reasons, the
Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the lower court.205
The disappointed couple subsequently appealed the Minnesota
Supreme Court's ruling to the U.S. Supreme Court. On appeal, the
same-sex couple explicitly raised three specific constitutional questions:
Whether appellee's refusal to sanctify appellants' marriage deprives
appellants of their liberty to marry and of their property without due
process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Whether appellee's refusal, pursuant to Minnesota marriage statutes,
to sanctify appellants' marriage because both are of the male sex
violates their rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Whether appellee's refusal to sanctify appellants' marriage deprives
them of their right to privacy under the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendments.2 0 6
However, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected all three of these
arguments when it ordered, on October 10, 1972, that "[t]he appeal [be]
dismissed for want of a substantial federal question."207
At the time that Baker was dismissed, the Supreme Court held
mandatory appellate jurisdiction over cases brought on direct appeal. 20 8
Therefore, the Court considered the merits of the Baker appeal and
found the appeal to be so lacking as to not even raise a substantial
federal question. Consequently, under the rule of Hicks v. Miranda,2 0 9
this dismissal was an adjudication on the merits and duly binding on
lower courts.2 10
Of course, the precedential effect of a summary affirmance like
Baker "can extend no farther than 'the precise issues presented and
Therefore, to determine
necessarily decided by those actions."'
203. Wardle & Oliphant,supra note 15, at 139.
204. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187. The court also cited McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184
(1964). In McLaughlin, the U.S. Supreme Court "for precisely the same reason of classification
based only upon race, struck down a Florida criminal statute which proscribed and punished
habitual cohabitation only if one of an unmarried couple was white and the other black." Baker,
191 N.W.2d at 187 n.5.
205. Baker, 191 N.W.2d at 187.
206. Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 139-40.
207. Baker, 409 U.S. at 810. The Court's dismissal for want of a substantial federal
question further supports the state's primacy over marriage. See supra Part III.A for further
discussion of this argument.
208. See Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 140.
209. Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975).
210. Id. at 344. "The Rule of Hicks v. Miranda has some twists and turns-and plenty of
nuance-but it is still good law and binding on lower courts." Wardle & Oliphant, supra note
15, at 141.
211. Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 182 (1979)
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whether a summary disposition is binding in a later proceeding, lower
courts must look to see which precise constitutional questions were
presented on appeal. 212 When a similar challenge comes before it, "a
lower federal court must consider itself bound by the dismissal." 2 13
In Perry, the court acknowledged that the constitutional issues were
extremely similar to Baker.2 14 Therefore, the lower federal court in
Perry was legally bound by Baker. The court should have dismissed the
case before trial.
Despite this, however, the Perry court circumvented this binding
precedent, choosing instead to distinguish the case based upon
subsequent Supreme Court decisions concerning sexual orientation. 2 15
Without question, many important doctrinal developments have
occurred since Baker, and occasionally, courts will attempt to
distinguish a case in this way. Romer v. Evans216 and Lawrence v.
Texas7 were two decisions that Perry relied heavily upon to
distinguish Baker.2 18 However, even if Romer and Lawrence
distinguished Baker's application to Perry,2 1 9 other reasons still exist
why Romer and Lawrence do not render Proposition 8 unconstitutional;
unless, as in Perry,the court deciding the issue is judicially active.
First, Romer does not breathe new life into the constitutionality of
same-sex marriage because the Court's decision in Romer was a very
narrow one. The law struck down in Romer was a provision in the
Colorado State Constitution that barred all levels of government from
any attempt to protect homosexuals against discrimination.2 2 0 "The
constitutional flaw of the Colorado statute was its extreme overbreadth,22 ' not the identity of the group it adversely affected." 222 As the
(quoting Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977)).
212. Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 140.
213. Pamela R. Winnick, Comment, The Precedential Weight of a Dismissal by the
Supreme Court for Want of a Substantial Federal Question: Some Implications of Hicks v.
Miranda, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 508, 511 (1976); see also Hicks, 422 U.S. at 344-45 (stating that
the "lower courts are bound by summary decisions by th[e] [Supreme] Court 'until such time as
the Court informs (them) that (they) are not"').
214. Transcript of Oral Argument on Motion for Summary Judgment at 76, Perry v.
Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. C 09-2292 VRW) (stating that the
"jurisdictional statement in Baker dealt with constitutional allegations similar to the challenges
in this case . . . .") [hereinafter Transcript].
215. Id. at 78.
216. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
217. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
218. Transcript, supra note 214, at 78. Proponents of same-sex marriage frequently use
Romer and Lawrence to distinguish Baker.
219. Given the validity of Baker, the Note's author still contends that Baker controls
Perry. The ensuing discussion is for argument's sake only.
220. Romer, 517 U.S. at 624.
221. Richard F. Duncan, "They Call Me 'Eight Eyes"': Hardwick's Respectability,
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Court acknowledged, the statute imposed "a broad and undifferentiated
disability on a single named group" by not protecting the group against
"exclusion from an almost limitless number of transactions and
endeavors that constitute ordinary civic life in a free society." 223 Hence,
the outcome of the case would have been the same had the law affected
any other targeted group instead of homosexuals.224
Proposition 8, on the other hand, is completely unlike the Colorado
statute in Romer. Proposition 8 was not overbroad, nor did it "target a
class of persons and deny that class the opportunity to protect itself
politically against a limitless number of discriminatory harms and
exclusions. , The law simply seeks a prospective restoration of the
historical parameters of marriage and in actuality, allows anyone to
enter into that institution provided they comply with its timeless

definition. 226
Second, like Romer, Lawrence also fails to change the
constitutionality of same-sex marriage in any meaningful way.
Lawrence struck down a Texas provision that made "it a crime for two
persons of the same-sex to engage in certain intimate sexual
conduct."227 However, applying the Lawrence Court's analysis, which

Romer 's Narrowness, and Same-sex Marriage, 32 CREIGHTON L. REV. 241, 253 (1998) (arguing
that the Court's inference of animus came not from the identity of the disadvantaged group, but
instead from the sheer breadth of disability created by Amendment 2); see Romer, 517 U.S. at
632.
222. Duncan, supra note 221 (arguing that Romer "would have been decided in exactly the
same way if Amendment 2 had affected smokers, insurance salesmen, or any other targeted
group instead of homosexuals."); see also Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
223. Romer, 517 U.S. at 631-32.
224. Duncan, supra note 221, at 250.
225. Id. at 251.
226. Under Proposition 8, no one is excluded from marrying. However, it is impossible for
two people to marry if they do not meet the fundamental, legal definition of what a marriage
is-the union of one man and one woman. Merely entering into another type of relationship and
calling it a marriage does not make it so. It is much like a story attributed to Abraham Lincoln.
He is said to have once asked another individual how many legs a dog would have if the tail was
counted as a leg. When the individual responded, "five legs," Lincoln said, "No; calling a tail a
leg doesn't make it a leg." J. BARLETT, THE SHORTER BARTLETT'S FAMILIAR QUOTATIONs 218(D)

(1961). In addition, complying with a statutory definition in order to enjoy legal benefits is not a
strange notion in the law. For example, a person seeking to enjoy the legal preferences of a
particular type of business organization must ensure that their organization meets all the
elements of the applicable statutory regulations. He or she cannot expect to enjoy the legal
benefits of an S-Corporation, if their company is missing a key legal element of an SCorporation. Likewise, one cannot lawfully establish an S-Corporation, but instead choose to
call it an LLC and thus expect the legal benefits that accompany an LLC. Simply classifying an
entity a certain way is futile unless that entity actually satisfies the requirements under the law.
In this way, marriage is no different.
227. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003).
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relied heavily upon the inherent right of privacy within a home,2 28 to the
supremely public institution of marriage is dubious at best. Under
Lawrence, a same-sex couple has the right to be left alone "in the
confines of their homes and their own private lives." 229 "Nevertheless,
the rhetoric-as well as the reasoning-of the case is exhausted once
that couple steps out of its private home and into the public sphere." 230
Indeed, marriage is an extraordinarily public institution, 231 and samesex couples seek not to be left alone, "but rather to be accorded public
status, and benefits."232 Lawrence simply does not extend
recognition,
2
33
this far.
In addition to these distinguishing factors, neither Romer nor
Lawrence classified homosexuals to be a suspect or quasi-suspect
228. See, e.g., id. at 567 (noting that the sodomy statute touched "upon the most private of
human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.").
229. Id.
230. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 126.
231. There are so many important public social consequences to marriage. "Marriage is
carefully defined and regulated by the law because the public has a huge interest in protecting
this basic social institution. People are vulnerable in marriages, and when marriages fail, society
must pick up the pieces and the public incurs social costs such as increased mental health
treatment, medical services, juvenile delinquency, impaired education, and reduced labor
productivity." Wardle, supra note 2, at 1369-70.
232. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 122.
233. Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's scathing dissent, Lawrence does not support samesex marriage. For example, as Justice O'Connor wrote in concurrence using equal protection
analysis:
That this law as applied to private, consensual conduct is unconstitutional under
the Equal Protection Clause does not mean that other laws distinguishing
between heterosexuals and homosexuals would similarly fail under rational
basis review. Texas cannot assert any legitimate state interest here, such as
national security or preserving the traditional institution of marriage.
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In addition, even the majority opinion
provides some indication that Lawrence will not be extended to support same-sex unions. For
example, as Justice Kennedy writes:
The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to
choose without being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should
counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects.
Id. at 567. The author acknowledges, however, that the majority opinion does have signs which
seemingly indicate that the Court finds a link between Lawrence and same-sex marriage. See,
e.g., id. (stating that "[w]hen sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is more enduring. The liberty
protected by the Constitution allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.").
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class.234 Therefore, both cases applied the law's lowest standard of
judicial review-the rational basis test. 235 Under this standard, "social
legislation is presumptively valid" and states are afforded considerable
latitude in creating classifications "designed to carry out ordinary
legislative purposes." 236 In fact, a law must be upheld "if there is any
reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a rational basis
for the classification." 23 7 In this way, courts do not have license to
"judge the wisdom, fairness, or logic of [these] legislative choices." 238
Admittedly, no rational basis existS239 for the government to
sweepingly deny all legal redress to a specific group 240 or regulate truly
private, adult conduct, which occurs within a home.41 Marriage,
however, is a remarkably different issue. Marriage is a very public
institution with extraordinary social consequences. 242 Indeed, when
marriages fail, society incurs substantial social costs such as increased
health care expenditures and juvenile delinquency.243 Thus, the public,
acting through its government, has a tremendous interest in protecting
and preserving this influential institution of marriage in any lawful way
possible.2 44 This is precisely why Proposition 8 was enacted. Thus, laws
like Proposition 8 satisfy rational basis review while the statutes struck
down in Romer and Lawrence do not.245 For these reasons, the Perry
234. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578; Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632-33 (1996).
235. At least Lawrence implied the use of rational basis review, though the decision was
silent about the level of scrutiny it used. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578. Many constitutional
scholars have identified this type of rational basis review to be "rational basis with bite." See,
e.g., Gayle Lynn Pettinga, Rational Basis with Bite: Intermediate Scrutiny by Any Other Name,
62 IND L.J. 779, 780 (1987).
236. Duncan, supra note 221, at 252; see also Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 219 (1993)
(demonstrating that law benefits from a "strong presumption of validity" under rational basis
review).
237. F.C.C. v. Beach Commc'ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313 (1993).
238. Id.
239. That is to say that no rational basis exists other than a moral basis. Though many
would argue that a moral basis is sufficient, after Lawrence, the state cannot legislate based
upon morality without an accompanying secular purpose. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571.
240. See generally Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996).
241. See generallyLawrence, 539 U.S. at 562.
242. See supra text accompanying note 230.
243. Id.
244. Consider, for example, the harm that unilateral, no-fault divorce has had on America.
This practice was adopted in the United States about 40 years ago, and there have been
incredible detrimental consequences that have ensued because of it. See BARBARA DAFOE
WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 68-71 (1997) (indicating that in the 60s and 70s, advocates

of no-fault divorce argued that it would be beneficial for adults and children); id at 93-106
(noting that research in the '80s began to show the long-term harms of divorce on both adults
and children, and this data has only begun to grow since that time). Same-sex marriage is a
further destabilization of the marriage relationship that could incur great social costs.
245. Laws which limited marriage to conjugal unions are easily justified under rational
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court was bound by Baker, and in the alternative, even if Romer and
Lawrence were applied, these cases do not render Proposition 8
unconstitutional.
V. PERRY'S OTHER FATAL FLAWS
While the Perry court unquestionably trampled upon the principles
of federalism, democracy, and separation of powers, and ignored the
binding power of precedent, the district court's ruling was also severely
flawed in numerous other ways. To be sure, these other errors further
support the reality that the Perry court drastically overstepped proper
judicial boundaries in rendering this most alarming decision.
For example, a glaring flaw in Perry was the failure of Judge
Vaughn A. Walker, the jurist who rendered the decision, to either recuse
himself or at least inform the litigants of information which suggested
that he had or could reasonably be thought to have had a serious bias in
the case.246 As Dr. John Eastman, a renowned constitutional law scholar
and former law school dean, indicated "a federal judge has a duty to
recuse himself when he cannot fairly adjudicate the proceedings before
him, and he clearly has a duty to inform other parties of any information
that may suggest a potential for judicial bias." 247 This unquestionably
true sentiment has actually been codified into federal law.
Specifically, 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that "[a]ny justice, judge,
or magistrate judge of the United States shall disqualify himself in any
proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned." 2 48 In addition, a federal judge shall disqualify himself
basis review, yet the court struck down each justification that the state proffered to uphold
Proposition 8. See Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921, 997-1003 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
Even Justice O'Connor opined in her concurrence in Lawrence that "laws restricting marriage to
heterosexual couples were constitutionally valid and appropriated protections of the 'legitimate
state interest(s]' in marriage." Wardle & Oliphant, supra note 15, at 143 (quoting Lawrence, 539
U.S. at 585 (O'Connor, J., concurring)); see also supra text accompanying note 232.
246. John C. Eastman, Should Judge Have Recused Himself on Prop 8?, S.F. CHRON.,
Aug. 11, 2010, at Al0, availableat http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-08- 1/opinion/22213940 1
parties-judge-walker-new-trial.
247. Lynn D. Wardle, The Judicial Imposition of Same-sex Marriage: The Boundaries of
Judicial Legitimacy and Legitimate Redefinition of Marriage, 50 WASHBURN L.J. 79, 104
(20 10); see also Eastman, supra note 246.
248. 28 U.S.C. § 455 (a). As indicated, this rule utilizes the objective standard of
reasonableness; thus, a fanciful argument or a litigant's caprice is not sufficient basis to
disqualify a judge. See generally In re Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 861 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir.
1988), cert. denied 490 U.S. 1102 (1989); see also Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 129 S.
Ct. 2252 (2009). Instead, an objective ground for disqualification must exist. However, the
litigants may also waive any ground for disqualification under this provision. See 28 U.S.C. §
455(e).
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when "[h]e knows that he, individually or as a fiduciary . . . has a
financial interest in the subject matter in controversy . . . or any other

interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the

proceeding." 24 9
In Perry, the chief concern is not that Judge Walker is himself
homosexual.so Instead, the predicament lies in the fact that Judge
Walker allegedly has a same-sex partner who could potentially benefit
from the outcome of the proceeding. 2 5 1 Judge Walker could be thought
to have had a substantial interest in allowing same-sex marriage if he
wants to marry his same-sex partner, and "he may also have financial
and other valuable legal interests in the outcome of this case if the
ability to marry his partner could produce financial or other legal
benefits to him (or to his partner)." 2 52 For this reason, Judge Walker had
a duty to either recuse himself, or at least fully disclose these potential
biases. Judge Walker's failure to do so casts widespread doubt in the
integrity of a very controversial decision.
A second key defect, which indicates Perry's judicial activism, was
the court's order of intrusive discovery into the internal communications
and sensitive documentation of the defendant's "Yes on 8" political
253
It was not until the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal
campaign.
intervened that the invasive and unconstitutional order of the trial court
was overturned.25 4 As the Ninth Circuit noted, such intrusive discovery
would have a chilling effect on political speech because citizens would
be more hesitant to engage in political campaigns out of fear that
sensitive and confidential communication could possibly become
public. 255 The court's endorsement of invasive and ultimately unlawful
discovery further supports the colorable claim that the court was
judging with the results-oriented approach that is a tell-tale sign of
249. 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4). Unlike 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), this provision cannot be waived by
the litigants. See 28 U.S.C. § 455(e).
250. Wardle, supra note 247; Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Judge Being Gay a Nonissue During Prop. 8 Trial, SFGATE.COM (Feb. 7, 2010), http://articles.sfgate.com/2010-0207/bay-area/17848482_1_same-sex-marriage-sexual-orientation-judge-walker.
Many major
media outlets have widely reported that Judge Walker is a homosexual that has allegedly been in
a long-term relationship with another male. Id. He and his same-sex companion, a physician,
have allegedly been seen attending various public events, including local bar functions. Id; see
also Eastman, supra note 246.
251. Eastman, supra note 246.
252. Wardle, supra note 247.
253. Id.
254. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Ethics and Public Policy Center in Support of Appellants
at 12, Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 704 F. Supp. 2d 921 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (No. 10-16696),
http://www.eppc.org/docLib/20100927 Perryamicusfull.pdf.
255. SFGate.com, Court Tosses Prop. 8 Ruling on Strategy Papers (Dec. 12, 2009), bttp://
www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f-/c/a/2009/12/1 1/BA3Al B34VC.DTL; Wardle, supra note
247.
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judicial improvisation.
A third, extremely prejudicial flaw of Perry that further signifies its
extreme judicial activism was the court's attempt to televise the trial
contrary to established federal rules. 25 6 This atternt appeared to be in
collusion with the plaintiffs strategic campaign.2 At first, the court
declared that it would broadcast the trial across the country via
television and the internet.25 8 However, the defense and many others
raised several objections that such a broadcast would violate even the
local court rules.25 Not to be deterred by these objections or the local
rules that the objections were soundly based upon, the Perry court
announced a roposed change in the rules that would allow the trial to
be televised.
By law, before any court-proposed rule can be enacted, a notice and
comment period is required under 28 U.S.C. § 2701(b) to provide a
public forum for commentary and criticism. 261 In a "clever" maneuver,
the court opened that legally required notice and comment period by
sending out an email notification on New Year's Eve, clearly a time
when most are busy and distracted by seasonal festivities.26 2 Given the
holiday season and the gravity of this decision, many found the court's
lack of a more formal declaration or notification quite shocking,
particularly in such a controversial case.263 What was even more
astounding, however, was the fact that the comment period only
extended for five business days. 264 In addition, the comment period
cunningly terminated on the Friday before the trial was set to begin. 26 5
This calculated measure provided Judge Walker with just enough time
to enter another order to transmit the trial.2 6 6 Fortunately, the U.S.
Supreme Court intervened to quell the Perry court's questionable
efforts.2 67 In fact, the High Court later permanently prohibited the Perry
In a bold move
court from televising the proceeding altogether.
despite the High Court's ruling, Judge Walker still elected to videotape

256. Whelan, supra note 91.
257. Wardle, supra note 247.
258. Whelan, supra note 91.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See 28 U.S.C. § 2701(b).
262. Whelan, supra note 91.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Wardle, supra note 247, at 105.
267. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 130 S. Ct. 2432 (2010). The Court held that the lower federal
court had failed to follow proper legal procedure in ordering live video streams of the trial. Id.
268. Id.
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the proceedings, and perchance, future broadcasts would be allowed.2 6 9
Although the U.S. Supreme Court prevented the transmission of the
trial, the efforts to publicize were not without major prejudicial effect
for the defense. One foreseeable consequence of these efforts was to
cause most of the defense's witnesses to back out of testifying in open
court. Many of these witnesses had experienced extensive harassment
and violent threats from same-sex marriage advocates even before the
attempt to publicize the trial had occurred.27 0 However, once the Perry
court decided to televise the proceedings, most of these witnesses
(understandably) would not risk further exposure to even greater and
more widespread harm. As a result, they withdrew.
In reality, "Judge Walker either was unreasonably oblivious,
ignorant, or naYve concerning the potential that televising the trial would
have caused intimidation and harassment of the witnesses and
parties."2 7 1 Indeed, for more than a year, supporters of Proposition 8 had
been subject to "wide-spread political reprisal, stalking, assault,
intimidation, employment discrimination, and economic and other
forms of retaliation." 7 2 Furthermore, organizations and businesses that
had supported the initiative were exposed to extraordinary animus,
violence, and hostility. In fact, radical activists of same-sex marriage
specifically targeted many of these organizations. These activists
attacked several of their members and defaced much of their
property. 273 "In the face of public knowledge of such harassment, Judge
Walker's decision to try to televise the trial eliminated in one stroke
three-fourths of the expert witnesses the defendants planned to call."2 74
Without question, the court's efforts in this way could not have been
anything but calculated, further suggesting the court was judicially
active.
All in all, the list of flaws and biases in Perry go on and on. . . each
one indicating that the court was judicially active. Ultimately, the ruling
was so unsound "constitutionally, procedurally, and substantively that it
is debatable whether any responsible person could claim reasonable

269.

See John Elwood, Impromptu Supreme Court Decision in Gay Marriage Case,

VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 13, 2010), http://volokh.com/2010/01/13/impromptu-supreme-court-

opinion-in-gay-marriage-case/ (last visited Apr. 2, 2011).
270. Egelko, supra note 92. See supra Part LA for a discussion on the public backlash
against Proposition 8 supporters. For a discussion on how targeted violence can influence and
affect witnesses, see Lithwick, supra note 65.
271. Wardle, supra note 247, at 105.
272. Id.
273. Lynn D. Wardle, Marriage and Religious Liberty: Comparative Law Problems and
Conflict of Laws Solutions, 12 J.L. & FAM. STuD. 315, 343-47 (2010) (citing several reports of
animus, hostility, and violence toward Proposition 8 supporters in California).
274. Wardle, supra note 247, at 105.
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belief in the reliability and legitimacy of the decision." 27 5 In fact, the
court's brash disregard for such bedrock principles of law and ethics
indicate that Perry was nothing more than a political show trial and a
use of the judicial process for political promotion. Indeed, if the court
hand only heeded federal precedent, no trial would have ever taken
276
Moreover, after evaluating the totality of the Perry court's
place.
behavior, the trial seemed eerily similar to legal proceedings often seen
in more totalitarian regimes, such as the fallen Union of the Soviet
Socialist Republics. 277 For these reasons, Perry was nothing more than a
mockery of justice in America.
VI.PERRY'S EFFECT ON MARRIAGE, FAMILY, AND SOCIETY
Perry's new, judicially-fashioned right to same-sex marriage not
only affronts America's core constitutional values, but also judicially
attacks the most important and fundamental unit of civilization: the
family.278 With a single stroke of a pen, the court in Perry, unilaterally
and absent proper authority, substituted the citizen's will for that of a
judicial majority. 2 79 Acting under a charade of justice, this solitary act
redefined the marital and family relationship in such a way that has no
basis in history or the law.
In reality, Perry places marriage on a slippery-slope that could lead
to the "conferral of all legislative preferences now reserved for marriage
upon any form of consensual sexual coupling, no matter how
idiosyncratic."2 8 0 Thus, if Perry stands,2 8 1 there is no longer any
principled basis to deny those who also want to call incestuous or
polygamous relationships "marriages."282 Where does it end? Only time
will tell. However, the question that remains is: What will the ultimate
price be on society?
While same-sex marriage proponents commend and applaud the
court's ruling, it is impossible for one to predict or fully appreciate the
275. Id. at 104.
276. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), dismissing appeal from 191 N.W.2d 195
(Minn. 1971) (dismissing the case for lack of a substantial federal question). See supra Part I1I.C
for a more in-depth discussion concerning Baker v. Nelson.
277. Wardle, supra note 247; Edward Whelan, Judge Walker's Anti-Prop 8 Sham Trial,
NAT'L REV. ONLINE, July 12, 2010, http://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/230960/
judge-walker-s-anti-prop-8-sham-trial/ed-whelan (last visited Apr. 10, 2011); John Yoo, Gay
Marriage:Leave It to the Voters, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2010, at A15.
278. See Berger, supra note 4.
279. Lund & McGinnis, supra note 113, at 1602.
280. Wilkins, supra note 9, at 122.
281. The decision is currently on appeal to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.
282. Wardle, supra note 2, at 1371.

20111

PERRY v. SCHWARZENEGGER: A JUDICIAL A 7TACK ON TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE

179

283

pervasive effect this decision will have on society. This Note does not
even portend to make such an outlandish attempt. However, although
actual ramifications can only be estimated, one thing is indisputably
true: the effect of Perry goes well beyond the issue of marriage. In fact,
Perry's unparalleled redefinition of marriage will likely have a
profound influence on primary social values such as adoption, public
education, and civil rights.
Without question, legalizing same-sex marriage arguably
undermines many of the rights of those who oppose the practice. If
same-sex marriage is legalized, then opposition to the practice could be
deemed "invidious discrimination" and therefore, punishable by law.2 84
Such liability poses a serious threat to public schools, teachers, adoption
agencies, psychologists, social workers, marriage counselors, fertility
25
experts, religious organizations, private groups, and many others.
Workers could face job discrimination and civil liability.286 In addition,
organizations that oppose same-sex marriage, if legalized, could be
forced to conform or lose government contracts, employment
opportunities, licensing arrangements, tax benefits, and other
interests.287 While same-sex marriage supporters adamantly refute these
claims, history is replete with examples that simply prove otherwise.
For instance, the harassment and legal action against parents,
teachers, public employees, and church-affiliated adoption agencies in
Massachusetts, during the time since the legalization of same-sex
marriage in that jurisdiction, indicates the type of future harm that can
be expected if28 8 Perry stands. 289 Massachusetts has also been the site of
numerous controversies concerning the teaching of homosexuality in
public schools. One such controversy was the experience of David
283. This is precisely the reason why democratic processes are better designed to institute
such changes. Democracy implements change more gradually and provides an easier process to
repeal those changes that later prove to have unforeseen and undesirable drawbacks. On the
contrary, the doctrine of stare decisis protects changes implemented through judicial decree
even if these changes later have unforeseen consequences. See Part III.B supra for a further
discussion.
284. Wardle, supra note 2, at 1378.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. Id.
288. The decision is currently on appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal.
289. See, e.g., Thomas J. Paprocki, Marriage,Same-Sex Relationships, and the Catholic
Church, 38 Loy. U. CHLi.
L.J. 247, 260-61 (2007) (describing incidents in Massachusetts where
Catholic Social Services had been excluded and attacked); Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston,
WEEKLY STANDARD, May 15, 2006, at 20 (reporting that a Catholic group, which had provided

adoption services for over one hundred years, had been forced to close its adoption work in
Massachusetts because a state law was adopted which required all agencies, including churchaffiliated agencies, to place children for adoption with gay and lesbian adults that were seeking
to adopt).
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Parker who was arrested when he demanded parental notification before
discussing homosexual marriage with his six-year old son.290 He was
charged with criminal trespassing, and his first-grade son was later
bullied and beaten at school for his father's protests. 2 91
In addition, private organizations also face serious consequences and
liability for refusing to endorse a redefinition of marriage that includes
same-sex couples. For instance, the Boy Scouts of America, a private
organization which prohibits openly homosexual members or leaders
from participating, has often been denied the use of public lands and

facilities. 292
"The most recent example of this is in Philadelphia, where the
Scouts have been ordered by the openly gay City Solicitor to vacate a
building that they built with their own funds nearly eihty years ago and
donated to the city in return for a lease in perpetuity."
Indeed, religious organizations and their members are particularly
exposed to liability. Many such organizations provide a variety of
public services from soup kitchens to homeless shelters, from social
services to hospitals. 2 94 Moreover, such groups frequently refuse to
recognize same-sex marriages based upon core theological doctrines
that they have held dear for hundreds of years. However, if same-sex
marriage is legalized, the desire of these religious associations to serve
and help others is pitted against their own doctrinal tenets. As a result,
they must choose to either recognize these same-sex relationships or
stop offering various public services and lose their tax-exempt status.295
For instance, the Catholic Church ceased operation of an adoption
agency after over a hundred years of service when Massachusetts
passed a law which required all agencies to place children for adoption
with homosexual adults seeking to adopt. 29 Thus, churches are forced
to make difficult decisions between firmly-held doctrines and a desire to
serve others. Such decisions have widespread effects on the public and
society. To be sure, these religious organizations' right to worship is
arguably undermined by their duty to sustain the law.
All in all, it would be one thing if the majority of Californians had
desired a legalization of same-sex marriage and had thus voted in favor
of it. But, the reality is that the majority of Californians did not. They
290. Wendy McElroy, Parental Rights vs. Public Schools, Fox NEWS.COM (Aug. 10,
2005), http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,165253,00.html.
291. Id.
292. Wardle, supra note 2, at 1380.
293. Id.; see Robert Knight, Post Sugarcoats Thuggery Against PhiladelphiaBoy Scouts,
CULTURE & MEDIA INST. (Nov. 20, 2007), http://www.mrc.org/cmilarticles/2007/PostSugarcoa

tsThuggery AgainstPhiladelphiaBoy Scouts.html.
294. Wardle, supra note 2, at 1379.
295. Id. at 1380.
296. See supra text accompanying note 284.
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voted to preserve the traditional and timeless definition of marriage.
Instead, the single vote of an active federal judge in Perry has forced
these citizens to confront and endure widespread social effects that they
voted to steer clear of.
VII. FINAL THOUGHTS

In the end, the Perry court tried to give the appearance that it was
297
Hence, the court heard hours of
engaged in authentic judicial work.
testimony and presided over a lengthy trial. At the end of the trial, the
court rendered a decision and issued an opinion to try to justify its
holding. 2 98 The opinion not only cited cases and contained seemingly
sound legal analysis, but was also judicially well-crafted, professional,
and extremely convincing. 299 All in all, the court appeared to be acting
in the same way that any court exercising proper judicial power would
act. But in going beyond, in creating a new "constitutional" right to
same-sex marriage, the court was not engaged in judicial business at
all.300 Instead, it was a judicial attack on traditional marriage. The court,
acting under the guise of judicial review, unilaterally took the matter out
of the normal legislative processes and utterly betrayed the core
principles of the American Constitution; namely federalism, democracy,
and separation of powers. 30 1 In doing so, the court also committed
several glaring errors which cast further doubt on the integrity of a
decision which has widespread social affects. Overall, this mockery of
justice can only be described as judicial activism.

297. Wardle, supra note 19, at 93.
298. Id.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Graglia, supra note 20, at 1141.
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